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J. Bradford De Long 
In a world organized in accordance with Keynes’ specifications, 
there would be a constant race between the printing press and the 
business agents of the trade unions, with the problem of unemploy- 
ment largely solved if the printing press could maintain a constant 
lead. 
Jacob Viner, “Mr. Keynes on the Causes of Unemployment” 
6.1  Introduction 
Examine the price level in the United States over the past century. Wars see 
prices rise sharply, by more than  15% per year at the peaks of  wartime  and 
postwar  decontrol  inflation.  The National  Industrial  Recovery  Act  and  the 
abandonment of the gold standard at the nadir of the Great Depression gener- 
ated a year of  nearly  10% inflation. But aside from wars and Great Depres- 
sions, at other times inflation is almost always less than 5% and usually 2-3% 
per year-save  for the decade of the 1970s. 
The 1970s are America’s only peacetime outburst of inflation. The sustained 
elevation of inflation for a decade has no parallel in the past century (fig. 6.1). 
The 1970s was the only era in which business enterprise and financing transac- 
tions  were  also “speculation[s]  on the future  of monetary  policy”  (Simons 
1947) and concern about inflation was an important factor in nearly all busi- 
ness decisions. 
J. Bradford De Long is associate professor of economics at the University of California, Berke- 
ley, an Alfred P.  Sloan Foundation research fellow, and a research associate of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
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Fig. 6.1  Annual inflation (GDP deflator), 1890-1995 
The cumulative impact of the decade of 5-10%  inflation was large, as figure 
6.2 shows. Since 1896, there has been a steady upward drift in the price level. 
Superimposed on this drift are rapid jumps as a result of World War I and the 
removal of World War 11’s price controls, and a sharp decline during the slide 
into the Great Depression. On this scale, the inflation of the 1970s was as large 
an increase in the price level relative to drift as either of this century’s major 
wars. And the inflation of the 1970s was broad-based: as figure 6.3 shows, the 
qualitative pattern  is similar  no matter  which particular  price  index  is ex- 
amined. 
Economists’ instincts are that uncertainty about current prices, future prices, 
and the real meaning of nominal trade-offs between the present and the future; 
distortions  introduced by  the failure of  government finance to be inflation- 
neutral; windfall redistributions; and the focusing of attention not on prefer- 
ences, factors of production, and technologies but on predicting the future evo- 
lution of nominal magnitudes must degrade the functioning of the price system 
and reduce the effectiveness of the market economy at providing consumer 
utility. The cumulative jump in the price level as a result of the inflation of the 
1970s may have been very expensive to the United States in terms of the asso- 
ciated reduction in human welfare.  I 
1. For a discussion of the failure of  public finance to be inflation-neutral, see Feldstein (1982). 
For an argument that the real costs of inflation just might be quite high, see Rudebusch and Wilcox 
(1994). For an argument that the reductions in consumption and the increases in risk occasioned 
by  inflation of the magnitude seen in the United States in the 1970s are relatively low (and thus 249  America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s 
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Fig. 6.2  Price level (GDP deflator, log scale), 1890-1995 
Why did the United States-and,  to a greater or lesser extent, the rest of the 
industrial world-have  such a burst of inflation in the 197Os? 
At the surface level, the United States had a burst of inflation in the 1970s 
because  no one-until  Paul Volcker took office as chairman of  the Federal 
Reserve-in  a position to make anti-inflation policy placed a sufficiently high 
priority on stopping inflation. Other goals took precedence: people wanted to 
solve the energy crisis, or maintain a high-pressure economy, or make certain 
that the current recession  did not get any  worse. As a result, policymakers 
throughout the 1970s were willing to run some risk of nondeclining or increas- 
ing inflation  in order to achieve other goals. After the fact, most such poli- 
cymakers believed  that they  had  misjudged  the risks, that they  would have 
achieved more of  their goals if they had spent more of  their political capital 
and institutional capability trying to control inflation earlier. 
At a somewhat deeper level, the United States had a burst of inflation in the 
1970s because economic policymakers during the 1960s dealt their successors 
a very bad hand. Lyndon Johnson, Arthur Okun, and William McChesney Mar- 
tin left Richard Nixon, Paul McCracken, and Arthur Burns nothing but painful 
dilemmas  with no attractive choices. And bad luck coupled  with bad  cards 
made the lack of  success at inflation control in the  1970s worse than anyone 
had imagined ex ante. 
implicitly that the heavy cost paid to reduce moderate inflation did not increase the general wel- 
fare), see Blinder (1987). For an argument that people feel that the costs of  inflation are very 
high-and  perhaps  that high  inflation enters  directly into the utility function  with a negative 




8  Yo 
6  Yo 
4% 
2  Yo 
0% 
4-  CPCU 





Price index for all final goods and services. 
Consumer price index for all urban consumers. 
Consumer price index for all urban consumers with revised 
rental-equivalent housing price component for the 1970s. 
Consumer price index for all urban consumers omitting volatile food 
and energy prices. 
Fig. 6.3  Inflation in the United States, 1951-94 
At a still deeper level, the United States had a burst of inflation in the 1970s 
that was not ended until the early 1980s because no one had a mandate to do 
what was necessary in the 1970s to push inflation below 4%, and keep it there. 
Had 1970s Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Bums tried, he might well have 
ended the Federal Reserve Board as an institution, or transformed it out of all 
recognition. It took the entire decade for the Federal Reserve as an institution 
to gain the power and freedom of action necessary to control inflation. 
And at the deepest level, the truest cause of the inflation of the  1970s was 
the shadow cast by the Great Depression. The Great Depression made it impos- 
sible-for  a while-for  almost anyone to believe that the business cycle was 
a fluctuation around rather than  a shortfall below some sustainable level of 
production  and employment. An  economy  would  have to have  some “fric- 
tional” unemployment, perhaps 1  % of the labor force or so, to serve the “inven- 
tory” function of  providing a stock of  workers looking for jobs to match the 
stock of vacant jobs looking for workers, An economy might have some “struc- 
tural” unemployment. But there was no good theory suggesting that either of 
these would necessarily be a significant fraction of the labor force. Everything 
else was “cyclical” unemployment: presumably curable by the expansionary 251  America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s 
policies that economists would now prescribe in retrospect for the Great De- 
pression. 
The shadow cast by the Great Depression had the least impact on economic 
policy in the 1950s, when Eisenhower administration officials who were con- 
cerned about rising  unemployment held the balance point between unrecon- 
structed Keynesians on the one hand and those who still believed in the possi- 
bility  of  rolling back the New  Deal on the other. But  even Eisenhower-era 
Council of  Economic Advisors  (CEA)  chairman  Arthur  Bums believed  as 
strongly as anyone that changing economic institutions and economic policies 
had tamed the business cycle. And critics of Eisenhower-era policies were suc- 
cessful at all levels-among  professional economists, among literate commen- 
tators, and in  the voting  booths-when  they  argued that  a decade like the 
1950s that showed above-par economic performance still fell far short of what 
the American economy could accomplish, and that it was important to “get the 
economy moving again.” 
Sooner or later in post-World War 11 America, random variation would have 
led the economy to fall off of the tightrope of full employment and low infla- 
tion on the overexpansionary side. Although there was nothing foreordained or 
inevitable about the particular way in which America found itself with strong 
excess aggregate demand at the end of the 1960s, it was foreordained and inev- 
itable that eventually some combination of shocks would produce a macroeco- 
nomy with strong excess demand. And once that happened-given  the shadow 
cast by the Great Depression-there  was no institution with enough authority, 
power, and will to quickly bring inflation back down again. 
It took the decade of the 1970s to persuade economists, and policymakers, 
that “frictional”  and “structural”  unemployment were far more than  1-2%  of 
the labor force (although we still lack fully satisfactory explanations for why 
this should be the case). It took the decade of the 1970s to convince economists 
and policymakers  that the political costs of even high  single-digit inflation 
were very high. Once these two lessons of the  1970s had been learned, the 
center of American political opinion was willing to grant the Federal Reserve 
the mandate to do whatever was necessary to contain inflation. But until these 
lessons had been learned, it is hard to see how the U.S.  government could have 
pursued an alternative policy of sustained disinflation in response to whatever 
shocks had happened to create chronic excess demand. 
It is in this sense that the inflation of the 1970s was an accident waiting to 
happen: the memory of the Great Depression meant that the United States was 
highly likely to suffer an inflation like that of the 1970s in the post-World  War 
I1 period-maybe  not as long, and maybe not in that particular decade, but 
nevertheless an inflation of  recognizably the same genus. 
Section 6.2 briefly sketches the background against which the decisions that 
led to the inflation of the  1970s were made. It examines the legacy left for 
economists  and  policymakers  by  John  Maynard  Keynes.  It  considers  the 252  J. Bradford De Long 
shadow cast by the Great Depression that created a climate in which few were 
willing to endorse any sacrifice of this year’s higher employment for next year’s 
lower inflation. It discusses whether economists’  visions had any significant 
impact on economic policy. And it summarizes how the boom of the  1960s 
left the United States with the relatively high and apparently persistent rate of 
increase in nominal wages that, in combination with oil price shocks and the 
productivity  slowdown, fueled the inflation of the 1970s. 
Section 6.3 narrates how a relatively  conservative administration as far as 
economic policy was concerned, the Nixon administration, wound up commit- 
ted to a policy of inflation reduction through wage and price controls rather 
than through monetary and fiscal restraint. One powerful  contributing factor 
was Nixon’s sensitivity to what he saw as the adverse political consequences 
of slow growth for his own reelection. A second was the natural desire to post- 
pone hard choices and to hope that good luck would make painful dilemmas 
go away. A third was that Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Bums had little 
confidence in the ability of  higher unemployment to put downward pressure 
on inflation. 
Section 6.4 considers the impact of the supply shocks of the 1970s on infla- 
tion. Section 6.5 discusses the slow and painful process by which a relative 
consensus to reduce inflation through monetary restraint emerged. Section 6.6 
summarizes the paper. 
6.2  The Background 
Involuntary unemployment is the most dramatic sign and disheart- 
ening consequence of underutilization of productive capacity. . . . 
We  cannot  afford  to  settle  for  any  prescribed  level  of  unem- 
ployment. 
John F.  Kennedy (emphasis added) 
6.2.1  The Legacy of Keynes? 
pects of Anti-Inflation Policy” (emphasis added): 
We come out with guesses like the following: 
. . . In order to achieve the nonperfectionist S goal of high enough output 
to give us no more than 3 percent unemployment, the price index might have 
to rise by as much as 4 to 5 percent per year. That much price rise would 
seem to be the necessary cost of  high employment and production  in the 
years immediately ahead. 
All this  is shown in our  . . . Phillips curve  [fig. 6.41.. . . The point A, 
corresponding to price stability, is seen to involve about 5.5 percent unem- 
ployment; whereas the point B, corresponding to 3 percent unemployment, 
is seen to involve a price rise of about 4.5 percent per annum. We rather 





Fig. 6.4  Estimated Phillips curve from Samuelson and Solow (1960) 
Nore: Original caption reads: “Modified Phillips Curve for U.S.  This shows the menu of choices 
between different degrees of unemployment and price stability, as roughly estimated from the last 
twenty-five years of American data.” 
expect that the tug of war of politics will end us up in the next few years 
somewhere in between. 
The authors are the best of the post-World  War I1 American economics pro- 
fession. Yet when we read these paragraphs and examine the associated figure, 
“Modified Phillips Curve for U.S.,”  we wince. 
Ignore the fact that the curve plotted between  points A  and B  is not “as 
roughly estimated from [the] last twenty-five years of American data.” When 
Samuelson and Solow wrote, they  were barely out of  the age where “com- 
puter” was a job description rather than a machine; they lacked the batteries of 
statistical procedures,  diagnostics,  and sensitivity  analyses that we use as a 
matter of course; and they did present the raw scatter of  unemployment and 
wage growth (in which it is hard to see any Phillips curve). The regression for 
the twenty-five years before 1960 of American wage growth on unemployment 
has no slope to the regression at a1L2 
Ignore the suppression of the magnitude of sampling variability and of un- 
certainty in the estimated parameters-even  though it had been nearly a de- 
cade since Milton Friedman (1953)  had made an extremely powerful argument 
2. It is possible-by  throwing out the Depression years (during which wages and prices rose, 
even with unemployment in double digits), throwing out the years of World War I1 price controls, 
and adding the  1920s into the sample-to  estimate a curve relatively close to Samuelson and 
Solow’s “menu of choices between different degrees of unemployment and price stability” with a 
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Fig. 6.5  Unemployment and wage growth minus 2.5% per year, 1935-60 
that successful stabilization policy requires that you know the structure of the 
economy with substantial precision: using erratic instruments in response to 
noisy signals of  the state of the system is likely to add variance and to make 
matters worse. 
What makes us wince the most is the description of 3% unemployment-a 
goal outside the historical operating range of  the peacetime economy-as  a 
“nonperfectionist’s goal.” 
Samuelson and Solow were not exceptional. As late as April 1969, ex-CEA 
chair Arthur Okun (1970) was calling for a long-term “4 percent rate of unem- 
ployment and a 2 percent rate of annual price increase” as possibly “compat- 
ible” with what he called “an optimistic-realistic view” of the structure of the 
American economy, and certainly as a target worth aiming at-even  though 
the post-World War I1 United States had been southwest of  Okun’s target in 
only one year (fig. 6.6). 
Thus economists in the 1960s were at least flirting with hubris by categoriz- 
ing as “nonperfectionist” policy goals that required shifting the economy be- 
yond and holding it indefinitely outside of its peacetime operating range. 
One standard explanation of the source of  this hubris is that it was part of 
the legacy left by John Maynard Keynes (1936). Jacob Viner’s review (1936) 
3. The American economy had not seen unemployment less than or equal to 3% save in wartime: 
1943-45  and 1952-53.  Lebergott (1964) had estimated unemployment in 1926 at less than 3%. 
But his concept of unemployment is the shortfall of measured employment relative to a “normal” 
cyclically insensitive labor force. It is not comparable to  post-World War I1 data and, as Romer 
(1986) has argued, incorrectly extrapolates employment patterns from manufacturing to other sec- 
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Fig. 6.6  Inflation and unemployment, 1954-69 
had forecast that, “in a world organized in accordance with Keynes’ specifica- 
tions, there would be a constant race between the printing press and the busi- 
ness agents of the trade unions, with the problem of unemployment  largely 
solved if the printing press could maintain a constant lead.”4 The policies un- 
dertaken-on  the recommendation  of Keynesians-in  the  1960s, and the in- 
flation that followed, lend plausibility to this interpretation. 
6.2.2  The Shadow of the Great Depression 
But it may be more accurate to see the views of Okun (1970) and of Sam- 
uelson  and Solow (1960) as a consequence of the very long shadow cast by 
the Great Depression. The Great Depression had broken any link that might 
have been drawn between the average level of unemployment over any time 
period,  and  the desirable, attainable, or sustainable level of  unemployment. 
With the memory of the Great Depression still fairly fresh, it was extremely 
difficult to argue that the normal workings of the business cycle led to fluctua- 
tions around any sort of equilibrium position. 
There was “frictional” unemployment-workers  looking for jobs and jobs 
looking for workers before the appropriate matches had been made-which 
served as a kind of “inventory” of labor for the economy. There could be “struc- 
tural” unemployment-people  with low skills in isolated regions where it was 
not worth any firm’s while to employ them at wages they would accept-which 
could not be tackled by demand-management tools. 
Everything else was “cyclical” unemployment: a smaller case of  the same 
4.  Viner also called Keynes’s book one “likely to have more influence than it deserves.” 256  J. Bradford De Long 
disease as the unemployment  of the Great Depression,  which could presum- 
ably be cured by the standard expansionary policy means that economists be- 
lieved would have cured the Great Depression if they had been tried at the time. 
The Great Depression had taught everyone the lesson that business cycles 
were shortfalls below, and not fluctuations around, sustainable levels of pro- 
duction and employment. As of the start of the 1960s,  there was no good theory 
to explain why  “frictional”  and “structural”  unemployment  should even to- 
gether add up to any significant fraction of the labor force.5 Thus anyone-it 
did not have to be John Maynard Keynes-developing  a macroeconomics in a 
context  in  which  the Great  Depression  was  the  dominant empirical  datum 
would find that the path of least resistance led to expansionary policy recom- 
mendations: Depression-level unemployment certainly did not serve any useful 
economic or social function; the bulk of observed post-World  War I1 unem- 
ployment looked like Depression-era unemployment;  therefore policy should 
be expansionary. 
6.2.3  Did Economists’ Optimism Matter? 
Did economists’  overoptimism matter? Did it make a difference that they 
were talking at the beginning of the 1960s of 3% unemployment as a “nonper- 
fectionist” goal, and were arguing at the end of the 1960s that 4% unemploy- 
ment and 2% inflation was likely to be a sustainable posture for the American 
economy over the long run? 
During periods of Republican political dominance, perhaps not: the 1950s 
saw not gap closing but rather stabilization policies of the kind that Herbert 
Stein had pushed for from the Committee on Economic Development (CED), 
as Eisenhower’s economic advisers balanced between  Keynesians to the left 
and residual Hooverites to the right. But during periods of Democratic political 
dominance, economists’ overoptimism almost certainly did matter. 
The core of the Democratic political coalition saw every level of unemploy- 
ment as “too high.” And economists’ professional  opinions  about what was 
and was not feasible, given the policy tools at the US. government’s disposal, 
were in a sense the only possible brake on the natural expansionary policies 
that would have been pursued in any case by  the post-World  War I1 Demo- 
cratic Party. 
Perhaps economic advisers would have proven irrelevant in any case. If the 
profession  had been  less heavily  concentrated  toward the Keynesian end of 
the spectrum, and if Walter Heller and James Tobin had possessed  views on 
macroeconomic policy like those of Arthur Burns and Herbert Stein, perhaps 
President Kennedy’s economic advisers would have had other names. 
It may be that for every conceivable policy there is an economist who can 
wear a suit and pronounce the policy sound and optimal, and that to a large 
5.  Indeed, as of the middle of the 1990s there is still relatively little to account for cross-country 
and cross-era differences in “natural” rates of unemployment. 257  America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s 
degree presidents and senators get the economic advice that they ask for. It may 
be that a less optimistic group of advisers drawn from the academic economics 
community would have had no more effect on macroeconomic policy in the 
1960s than advisers from the academic economics community had on fiscal 
policy at the beginning of the 1980s, when they pointed out that revenue pro- 
jections seemed, as Martin Feldstein (1994) politely put it, “inconsistent with 
the Federal Reserve’s very tight monetary policy.” 
Perhaps the United States was likely to see a spurt of inflation in the 1960s 
even had Republican political dominance continued throughout the decade. It 
may be that even a Republican president and a Republican Congress would 
have exhibited the same unwillingness to use fiscal and monetary tools to slow 
economic growth during the buildup of American forces in Vietnam. 
But sooner or later, the turning of the political wheel would bring a left-of- 
center party to effective power in the United States. And when that happened 
everything-the  memory of the Great Depression, the elements of that party’s 
core political coalition, the theories of  economists in the mainstream of  the 
profession-would  push for policies of significant expansion. 
If  4% unemployment had turned out to be the natural rate, the cry would 
have arisen for a reduction in unemployment to 2%.  It is well within the bounds 
of possibility that the United States might have avoided a burst of inflation in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. But then it would have been vulnerable to an 
analogous burst of  inflation in the late 1970s, or in the early 1980s. And if 
inflation had been avoided through the early 1980s, analogous policy missteps 
might well have generated inflation in the late 1980s. The “monetary constitu- 
tion” of  the United States at the end of  the 1960s made something like the 
1970s, at some time, a very likely probability. And I do not see how the “mone- 
tary constitution” could have  shifted to anything like its present state in the 
absence of an object lesson, like the experience of the 1970s. 
6.2.4  The Situation at the End of the 1960s 
By the beginning of  1969, the United States had already finished its experi- 
ment: was it possible to have unemployment rates of  4% or below without 
accelerating inflation? The answer was reasonably clear: no. Average nonfarm 
nominal wage growth, which had fluctuated around or below 4% per year be- 
tween the end of the Korean War and the mid-l960s,  was more than 6% during 
calendar 1968. 
A gap of 1.5 percentage points per year between wage and price inflation 
had prevailed on average in the post-Korean  War  1950s and the late 1960s. 
Given such a differential, from the perspective of the end of the 1960s a reduc- 
tion in inflation from 5% per year or more down to 2-3%  required some sig- 
nificant deceleration of nominal wage growth. 
Comparing patterns of wage and price inflation highlights an ambiguity in 
the character of  inflation in the  1970s. In prices, as measured by  the GDP 
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Fig. 6.7  GDP deflator and nonfarm wage inflation, 1950-94 
the peak of just over  10% in  1981 (fig. 6.7). In wages, the major jump had 
already occurred by 1968: rates of increase in nominal hourly wages were al- 
ready 6.5% per year, and rose to a peak of little more than 8% per year at the 
end of the 1970s. The difference springs, arithmetically, from the productivity 
slowdown  (which erased the  gap between core nominal wage  inflation  and 
core nominal price inflation) and the supply shocks of the 1970s (which pushed 
inflation temporarily above its “core” magnitude). 
The magnitude of  the inflation-control problem changed between the late 
1960s, when the problem became apparent, and the end of the  1970s, when 
Federal Reserve  chairman Paul Volcker embarked on the policies that pro- 
duced the Volcker disinflation and the recession of  1982-83.  But the qualita- 
tive nature of the problem did not change. By the end of  the  1970s, average 
nominal wage growth was some 8% per year rather than 6% per year, and the 
wedge between nominal wage and nominal price growth had vanished  as a 
result of the productivity slowdown. Thus Paul Volcker and his Open Market 
Committee at the end of the 1970s faced the problem of how to slow the rate 
of nominal wage growth, and thus the rate of core inflation, by some 5 percent- 
age points per year or so. Arthur Burns and his Open Market Committee at the 
beginning of the 1970s faced the problem of how to slow the rate of nominal 
wage growth, and thus the rate of  core inflation, by 2 percentage points per 
year or so. 
Such a permanent  deceleration in nominal wage growth might have been 
accomplished by shifting inflationary expectations downward directly (so that 
a lower rate of nominal wage increase would have been associated with the 259  America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s 
same rate of increase in real wages), or by  triggering a recession sufficiently 
deep and sufficiently long that fear of future excess supply in the labor market 
would restrain demand for rapid wage increases. 
6.3  Nixon’s Mistake 
I know there’s the myth of the autonomous Fed . . . [short laugh] 
and when you go up for confirmation some Senator may ask you 
about your friendship with the President. Appearances are going to 
be important, so  you can call Ehrlichman to get messages to me, 
and he’ll call you. 
Richard Nixon to Arthur Bums 
Could such a deceleration have been accomplished at the end of the 1960s? 
At  a technical level, of  course it could have. Consider inflation in  the five 
largest industrial economies, the G-5 (fig. 6.8). Before the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system, the price levels in these five coun- 
tries were loosely linked together. But the Bretton Woods system broke down 
at the beginning of the 1970s, and thereafter domestic political economy pre- 
dominated as inflation rates and price levels fanned out both above and below 
their pre-1970 track. 
West Germany was the first economy to undertake a “disinflation.” The peak 
of  German inflation in the  1970s came in  1971: thereafter the Bundesbank 
pursued policies that accommodated little of  supply shocks or other upward 
pressures on inflation. The mid-1970s cyclical peak in inflation was lower than 
the 1970-71  peak; the early-1980s cyclical peak in West German inflation is 
invisible. 
Japan began its disinflation in the mid-l970s, in spite of the enormous im- 
pact of the 1973 oil price rise on the balance of payments and the domestic 
economy of that oil-import-dependent country. The other three of the G-5- 
Great Britain, France, and the United States-waited  until later to begin their 
disinflations. France’s last year of double-digit inflation was 1980. Britain’s last 
year of  double-digit inflation was  1981. Certainly there were no “technical” 
obstacles to making the burst of  moderate inflation the United States experi- 
enced in the late 1960s a quickly reversed anomaly. 
6.3.1  Six Crises 
There were, however, political obstacles. The first of  them was  that  the 
newly elected president, Richard Nixon, was extremely wary of economic pol- 
icies that promised to fight inflation by  increasing unemployment. He attrib- 
uted his defeat in the 1960 presidential election to the unwillingness of Eisen- 
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Fig. 6.8  Inflation in the G-5 economies, 1950-94 
the risk of  triggering  increasing inflation.  We  know  that Nixon blamed  his 
defeat on a failure of Eisenhower to act as naive political-business-cycle theory 
suggests because Nixon (1962) says so: 
Two other developments occurred  before the convention, however, which 
were to have far more effect on the election outcome. . . . 
Early in March [1960], Dr. Arthur E. Burns . . . called me. . . . [He] ex- 
pressed  great  concern  about  the  way  the  economy  was  then  acting.. . . 
Burns’ conclusion was that unless some decisive government action  were 
taken,  and taken  soon, we were heading for another economic dip which 
would  hit  its  low  point  in  October,  just  before  the  elections.  He urged 
strongly that everything possible be done to avert this development . . . by 
loosening up on credit and. . . increasing spending for national security. The 
next time I saw the President, I discussed Bums’ proposals with him, and 
he in turn put the subject on the agenda for the next cabinet meeting. 
The matter was thoroughly discussed by the Cabinet. . . . [Sleveral of  the 
Administration’s economic experts who attended the meeting did not share 
his bearish prognosis., . . [Tlhere was strong sentiment against using the 
spending and credit powers of the Federal Government to affect the econ- 
omy, unless  and  until  conditions  clearly  indicated  a  major  recession  in 
prospect. 
In supporting Burns’ point of view, I must admit that I was more sensitive 
politically than some of the others around the cabinet table. I knew from 
bitter experience how, in both 1954  and 1958, slumps which hit bottom early 
in October contributed to substantial Republican losses in the House and 
Senate. . . . 
Unfortunately, Arthur Bums turned out to be a good prophet. The bottom 
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increased by 452,000. All the speeches, television broadcasts, and precinct 
work in the world could not counteract that one hard fact. 
Richard Nixon’s statement that he and Arthur Bums were forceful advocates 
of trying to fine-tune economic policy to avoid a preelection recession in 1960 
has led many to search diligently for evidence that they sacrificed economic 
health for political advantage in  1971-72  (see, for example, Tufte  1978). In 
fact, things were considerably more complicated: Democratic as well as Re- 
publican politicians were pressing Arthur Bums for faster money  growth in 
late 1971. 
Nevertheless, Nixon’s past had made him extremely sensitive to-and  eager 
to avoid-policies  that his Democratic political adversaries could and would 
characterize as the sacrifice of the economic welfare of working Americans for 
the benefit of Republican Wall Street bondholders. 
6.3.2  Wishing for Favorable Parameter Values 
Thus Herbert Stein (1984) describes how he and his colleagues at the Nixon- 
era CEA, Paul McCracken and Hendrik Houthakker, were “surprised and un- 
happy” when they learned that President Nixon had authorized labor secretary 
George Shultz to tell the AFL-CIO that the Nixon administration would “con- 
trol inflation without a rise of unemployment.” Afterwards, Stein concluded 
that he should have paid more attention to the subtext of his first meeting with 
Nixon, in December  1968: “He asked me what I thought would be our main 
economic problems, and I started, tritely, with inflation. He agreed but immedi- 
ately warned me that we must not raise unemployment.  I  didn’t  at the time 
realize how deep this feeling was or how serious its implications would be” 
(135). How  were economic  advisers to deal with  a situation in  which they 
found  the  Phelps-Friedman  argument-that  reducing  unemployment  would 
require  a period during  which inflation  would  have to be  above its natural 
rate-convincing,  yet in which their political superiors did not authorize such 
a policy? 
McCracken, Stein, and Nixon’s other economic advisers did so by minimiz- 
ing the cognitive dissonance: they reassured themselves that the rise of unem- 
ployment would not have to be large: “The inflation rate was about 5 percent 
at the beginning of 1969. It did not have to be reduced very far. Unemployment 
was only 3.3 percent. There seemed considerable room for an increase of un- 
employment  without reaching a level that anyone could consider unusually 
high” (Stein 1984, 150). They were hoping that parameters values would turn 
out to be favorable, and thus that the Nixon administration could avoid painful 
dilemmas. The relative optimism of the Nixon CEA as to the likely success of 
‘‘gradualism’’-tighten  monetary and fiscal policy until the unemployment rate 
rose just high enough to put downward pressure on inflation, and keep unem- 
ployment  there  until  inflation  was  no longer  perceived  as a problem-fits 
oddly with the lack of quantitative knowledge about the relationship between 
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Even today, after three decades during which price and unemployment gyra- 
tions have given us all the identifying variance we could possible wish, and 
during which the “accelerationist” Phillips curves of the style that Robert Gor- 
don and others started estimating very early in the 1970s have stayed remark- 
ably  stable, we do not know  enough about the structure of  the economy  to 
reliably plan a “gradualist” policy of inflation reduction. Straightforward sim- 
ple estimates of the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) 
today that take no account of  possible drift in parameters over the past forty 
years or of uncertainty about the “correct” specification tend to produce a one- 
sigma confidence interval for the NAIRU that runs from 5 to 7.5%: one chance 
in six that the “true” NAIRU is less than 5% unemployment, and one chance 
in six that the “true” NAIRU is greater than 7.5% in which case we are likely 
to see a very unpleasant inflation surprise in the next few years. 
I think that the power, formal correctness, and elegance of the Lucas critique 
has put into shadow the limits of  macroeconomic knowledge even assuming 
that the policy and institutional regime is unchanged. There is a sense in which 
Milton Friedman (1968) gave the wrong presidential address to the American 
Economic Association: he should have repeated  his message of  1953, “The 
Effects of  Full-Employment Policy on Economic Stability,” and argued that 
uncertainty about parameters makes “fine-tuning”-and  its cousin, “gradual- 
ism”-next  to impossible. 
6.3.3  “Progress toward Economic Stability” 
A third obstacle to a policy of disinflation in the early  1970s was that the 
newly installed chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Arthur Bums, did not 
believe that he could use monetary policy to control inflation. 
In  1959, Arthur Burns had given his presidential address to the American 
Economic Association, “Progress toward Economic Stability.” Burns spent the 
bulk of his time detailing how automatic stabilizers and monetary policy based 
on a better  sense of  the workings of  the banking system had made episodes 
like the Great Depression extremely unlikely in the future. 
Toward the  end of  his speech, Burns (1960,  18) spoke of an unresolved 
problem created by the progress toward economic stability that he saw: “a fu- 
ture of secular inflation.” 
During the postwar recessions the average level of prices in wholesale and 
consumer markets has declined little or not at all. The advances in prices 
that customarily occur during periods of business expansion have therefore 
become cumulative. It is true that in the last few years the federal govern- 
ment has made some progress in dealing with inflation. Nevertheless, wages 
and prices rose appreciably even during the recent recession, the general 
public has been speculating on a larger scale in common stocks, long-term 
interest rates have risen very sharply since mid-1958, and the yield on stocks 
relative to bonds has become abnormally low. All these appear to be symp- 
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Before World War I1 such inflationary expectations and pressures would have 
been erased by  a severe recession, and by the pressure put on workers’ wages 
and manufacturers’ prices by  falling aggregate demand. But Bums could see 
no way in which such pressures could be generated in an environment in which 
workers and firms rationally expected demand to remain high and recessions 
to be short. 
Bums’ skepticism about the value of monetary policy as a means of control- 
ling inflation in the post-World  War I1 era cannot but have been reinforced by 
the pressure for avoiding any significant rise in unemployment coming from 
his long-time ally, patron, and friend, President Nixon: “‘I know there’s the 
myth of the autonomous Fed . . .’ Nixon barked a short laugh. “. .  . and when 
you go up for confirmation some Senator may ask you about your friendship 
with the President. Appearances are going to be important, so you  can call 
Ehrlichman to get messages to me, and he’ll call you”’  (Ehrlichman 1982, 
248-49).  The date was October 23,  1969. The speaker was Richard Nixon. 
The listener was Arthur Bums. Nixon had just announced his intention to nom- 
inate Bums to replace William McChesney Martin as chairman of the Federal 
Reserve. Nixon was thinking, You see to it, Arthur: no recession. We can spec- 
ulate what Arthur Bums was thinking: just how independent was this central 
bank?6 
Making Arthur Bums and the Federal Reserve sensitive to White House con- 
cerns was a subject of conversation in Nixon’s White House in 1970 and 197  1. 
“What shall I say  to Arthur?’  Nixon would  ask. “Ask  him if  he shares the 
President’s objective of  full employment by  mid-1972,” George Shultz sug- 
gested. Paul McCracken added, “If  he says yes, say that the Fed’s monetary 
path can’t and won’t bring us to that outcome” (Ehrlichman 1982, 251). Such 
pressures must have made Bums sensitive to White House concerns, and may 
be the source of an axiom in the Federal Reserve’s institutional memory that 
the Federal Reserve is better off having fewer rather than more direct contacts 
with the White House staff. 
But Arthur Bums, once ensconced at the Federal Reserve, could take care 
of himself. He was  at least a match for Ehrlichman at bureaucratic intrigue. 
There is admiration in Ehrlichman’s recounting of one of Bums’s responses to 
a “stem admonition” from Nixon. Ehrlichman wrote that he found “Arthur 
[Burnsl’s response . . . so artfully ambiguous that I wrote it down: ‘You know 
the idea . . .  the idea that I would ever let a conflict arise between what I think 
is right and my loyalty to Dick Nixon is outrageous.”’ Thus Ehrlichman could 
tell a senior Federal Reserve official that “every morning when you look in the 
mirror, I want you to think ‘what am I going to do today to increase the money 
supply.”’  But Bums and his Open Market Committee would set monetary 
policy. 
6.  John Ehrlichman, the source of  the conversation, was in the room. But this picture is only as 
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We know that Arthur Bums placed little weight on being what Nixon called 
“a team player” because he began contradicting administration policy almost 
from the day he moved  into the chairman’s office. As a critic of  Kennedy- 
Johnson policy and as a counselor to the president in the first year of the Nixon 
administration, Bums had been opposed to wage-price guideposts. But things 
looked different from the Federal Reserve: on May 18, 1970, Bums called for 
Nixon to adopt an “incomes policy” to “shorten the period between suppres- 
sion of excess demand and restoration of price stability” (Stein 1984, 155). 
Paul McCracken, especially, was irritated because he thought that Bums had 
“proposed  [an  incomes  policy]  without  anything  in  mind  but  the  phrase” 
(Wells 1994, 61), but such a proposal is consistent with Burns’s vision. rfthe 
president who appointed you does not want a deep recession, and ifyou  do not 
believe that even a deep recession would generate significant downward pres- 
sure on prices-for  in post-World  War I1 circumstances who would believe ex 
ante that a recession would be deep or ex post that it would be long?-then 
you need some kind of incomes policy. That President Nixon is opposed to an 
incomes policy and is upset with your advocacy of it would be irrelevant, be- 
cause the alternatives to an incomes policy are things that the president would 
dislike even more. 
Thus there is a very  real sense in which monetary policy did not contain 
inflation in the early  1970s because it was not tried. And it was not tried be- 
cause the chairman of the Federal Reserve did not believe that it would work 
at an acceptable cost. Even the threatening breakdown of the fixed exchange 
rate system, which Bums “feared . . .  with a passion,” would not induce him to 
tighten sufficiently to risk a more-than-moderate  recession. Paul Volcker re- 
ports an “interesting discussion with Arthur Burns” over lunch at the American 
embassy in Paris, at which “the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board made 
one last appeal” to retain a system of  fixed exchange rates (see Volcker and 
Gyohten  1992, 113). Volcker reports that “to me, it simply seemed too late, 
and  with  some exasperation  I said to him  ‘Arthur, if  you want  a par value 
system, you better go home right away and tighten money.’ With a great sigh, 
he replied, ‘I would even do that.”’ 
In economists’ models, an important feature leading to higher-than-optimal 
inflation  is the  “time inconsistency”  of  economic  policy  (see Kydland  and 
Prescott  1977). It may be optimal for this year’s  central bank to build anti- 
inflation credibility, but it is also optimal for next year’s central bank to exploit 
that credibility through higher-than-anticipated inflation and thus higher-than- 
anticipated output and employment growth. Private-sector investors and firms 
sophisticated enough to look ahead to future stages of the economic-policy 
game tree thus make it impossible for a central bank to build  anti-inflation 
credibility through restrictive policies in the first place. In economists’ models, 
at least, a powerful factor keeping this year’s central bank from embarking on 
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that no one outside the bank will find its actions and commitments credible 
(Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum 1995). 
While the theoretical logic is impeccable and powerful, I have found no sign 
in Federal Reserve deliberations in the 1970s that time-inconsistency issues- 
either that future central bankers would not carry out the policies to which 
earlier central bankers had tried  to commit them, or that the private sector 
would fail to believe long-run commitments to a low-inflation policy-played 
any role in policy formation. Moreover, there have been none of the institu- 
tional changes thought likely to diminish the severity of  time-inconsistency 
problems since the 1970s, yet inflation has abated. And there were no signifi- 
cant  institutional  changes  between  the  low-inflation  1950s and  the  high- 
inflation  1970s. Time-inconsistency  issues may well exert a constant back- 
ground pressure toward higher inflation, but it is difficult to argue that shifts in 
the economy’s vulnerability to such problems has played much of a role in the 
variation of post-World  War I1 inflation rates. 
6.3.4  The Nixon Price-Control Program 
Herbert Stein (1984), especially, attributes to Arthur Burns a key role in the 
Nixon administration’s eventual adoption of a wage-price freeze in late 1971. 
The context was one of  a CEA averse to all forms of incomes policy, from 
guideposts on up, as “wicked in themselves and steps on the slippery slope . . . 
to controls” (143);  of  a president  who “did not like ‘incomes policies’ and 
knew they did not fit with his basic ideological position”( 143);  and of an oppo- 
sition party that had a “great interest in pointing out that there was another, 
less painful, route to price stability [than gradualism and recession], which Mr. 
Nixon was too ideological to follow” (155). And Bums’s intervention on the 
procontrols  side so that  “every editorial writer  who wanted to recommend 
some kind of incomes policy could say that ‘even’ Arthur Bums was in favor 
of it” (156) led Stein to liken 
the administration . . . [to] a Russian family fleeing over the snow in a horse- 
drawn troika pursued by wolves. Every once in a while they threw a baby 
out to slow down the wolves, hoping thereby to gain enough time for most 
of the family to reach safety. Every once in a while the administration would 
make another step in the direction of  incomes policies, hoping to appease 
the critics while the [gradualist] demand management policy would work. 
In the end, of course, the strategy failed and the administration made the 
final concession on August 15, 1971, when price and wage controls were 
adopted. (157) 
Rockoff (1984) finds nothing good in the 1971-74  experience with controls. 
The controls did not calm inflationary expectations. Instead, they appear to 
have created them-with  a general expectation that prices would rebound once 
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compliance, and administrative costs on the American economy. Perhaps most 
serious, the fact that wage and price controls were still in effect in the fall of 
1973, when the price of oil jumped, created a substantial divergence between 
the cost of energy to U.S. users and the world price of energy, which slowed 
down the process of adjustment. Energy price controls remained, until elimi- 
nated as one of the good deeds of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s. 
The Nixon controls program had an odd impact on monetary policy. The 
“Phase 11”  program consisted of a Cost of Living Council supervising a presi- 
dentially appointed Price Commission and a “tripartite” labor-management- 
public Pay Board. But in addition there was a Committee on Interest and Divi- 
dends (CID): the day after Nixon announced his controls program, the chair- 
man of the House Banking Committee, Wright Patman, argued that “if controls 
are needed on the wages of workers and the prices of businessmen, then surely 
the  prices-interest  rates-charged  by  banks  also need  to be  controlled” 
(Wells 1994, 113). Burns took the chairmanship of  the CID, presumably  in 
fear that the alternative chairman might be someone dangerous and in hope 
that the mere establishment of the CID would quiet populist critics of interest 
rate hikes. 
Burns’s hopes proved misguided. At one point-caught  between the likes of 
Wright Patman demanding that the CID keep interest rates from rising and his 
own desire to curb money growth-Bums  presided over a “dual prime rate,” 
by which banks were forced to charge borrowers of less than a third of a mil- 
lion below the prevailing prime interest rate. “What an ugly tree has grown 
from  your  seeds,” said  Richard  Nixon  to Arthur  Burns,  contemplating  the 
workings of  the CID (Wells 1994, 113). 
And perhaps the controls led to overoptimism, and hence to looser monetary 
and fiscal policy than would have otherwise been put in place, because of their 
apparent initial success. If so, the Nixon administration suffered less from such 
overoptimism than did its critics. Stein (1984, 411) cites Walter Heller, testi- 
fying before the Joint Economic Committee on July 27, 1972, that Nixon ad- 
ministration policy was too contractionary: ‘As I say, now that we are again on 
the [economic] move the voice of overcautious conservatism is raised again at 
the other [White House] end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Reach for the [mone- 
tary] brakes, slash the [fiscal] budget, seek an end to wage-price restraints.” 
And private-sector forecasters agreed.’ One of  the striking features of the 
inflation of the 1970s was that increases in inflation were almost always unan- 
ticipated. Figure 6.9 plots the average forecast for the forthcoming calendar 
year, made as late in the year as possible, from the survey of professional fore- 
casters alongside actual December-to-December GDP deflator inflation. In ev- 
ery single year in the 1970s, the consensus forecast made late in the previous 
year understated the actual value of inflation. 
7.  Rorner and Rorner (1995)  report the similar overoptimism-although  smaller in rnagnitude- 
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Moreover, in every year inflation was expected to fall. Anyone seeking to be 
reassured  about the future course of  inflation had to do nothing more than 
glance at the consensus of private-sector economic forecasters to be told that 
the economy was on the right track, and that inflation next year would be lower 
than it had been this year. Mistakes in judgment made by economists and gov- 
ernment policymakers were also shared by private-sector forecasters, and by 
those who paid to receive their forecasts. Perhaps the policies adopted truly 
were prudent and optimal given the consensus understanding of the structure 
of the economy held by both public- and private-sector decision makers. But 
this consensus understanding was flawed. 
6.4  Supply Shocks and Asymmetric Price Adjustment 
Blinder (1982) is among many who have argued that double-digit inflation 
in the 1970s had a single cause: supply shocks that sharply increased the nomi- 
nal prices of  a few categories of  goods, principally  energy and secondarily 
food, mortgage rates, and the “bounce-back” of prices upon elimination of the 
Nixon controls program. Such shocks were arithmetically responsible for, in 
Blinder’s words,  “the dramatic  acceleration  of  inflation between  1972 and 
1974?. . . The equally dramatic deceleration of inflation between  1974 and 
1976. . . . [And] while  the rate of  inflation . . . rose  about eight percentage 
points between 1977 and early 1980, the ‘baseline’ .  . .  rate may have risen by 
as little as three” (264). 
Arithmetic decompositions of the rise in inflation into upward jumps in the 
prices of special commodities were never convincing to those working in the 
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1995, 161-62)  asked: “The special conditions that drove up the price of  oil 
and food required purchasers to spend more on them, leaving them less to 
spend on other items. Did that not force other prices to go down, or to rise less 
rapidly than otherwise? Why should the average  level of prices be affected 
significantly by changes in the price of some things relative to others?’ 
Ball and Mankiw (1995)  have recently argued that the missing link in Blind- 
er’s  argument can be provided by  menu-cost  models.s Supply shocks entail 
large increases in the prices of goods in a few concentrated sectors. They re- 
duce nominal demand for products in each unaffected sector by a little bit- 
and so reduce the optimal nominal price in each unaffected sector by a small 
amount. Small administrative or information processing costs might plausibly 
prevent full adjustment in many of the unaffected sectors, leaving an upward 
bias in the overall price level. Concentrated shocks that are (1) significantly 
larger than the average variance of shocks but (2) not so large as to require 
relative price movements that overwhelm administrative and information pro- 
cessing costs in all sectors appear to have the best chance of generating large 
upward boosts in inflation. 
Ball and Mankiw (1995) argue that their indices of the asymmetry of relative 
price changes are better indices of supply shocks than are the standard direct 
measures of the supply shocks themselves. Certainly the swings in prices rela- 
tive to measures of  “core”  inflation like the average rate  of  nominal  wage 
growth are substantial, and match the dates of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) price increase announcements and of the acceler- 
ation of food price inflation in 1972-73. 
6.4.1  Did Supply Shocks Have Persistent Effects? 
The story as told by Blinder (1982) is that in the wake of the supply shocks 
of the 1970s makers of economic policy faced a very difficult choice. Should 
they refuse to accommodate the upward one-time jump in prices of the supply 
shock, thus restraining inflation at the cost of a depression? Or should they 
accommodate, watch increases in inflation get built into the pattern of  wage 
expectations and settlements, and end the episode having avoided a deep reces- 
sion at the price of a permanent jump in the rate of inflation? 
At least one strand of the conventional wisdom holds that such overaccom- 
modation in response to supply shocks was responsible for a good deal of the 
rise in inflation during the 1970s: policies that expanded the money supply to 
avoid a still deeper oil shock-driven recession succeeded in transforming what 
was a temporary burst of inflation into a permanent jump in the level of infla- 
tion by building it into the expected rate of change of the wage base. Yet the 
year-over-year plots of annual nominal wage growth lend little support to this 
view (fig. 6.10). 
Economywide nominal wage growth rises  slowly, smoothly, and steadily 
8. See Mankiw  1985; Akerlof and Yellen  1985; Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988; and Gordon 
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from its late-1960s plateau to its early 1980s peak without noticeable jumps 
surrounding supply shocks. The bursts of  inflation in  1972-74  and 1978-80 
are very visible in price inflation, yet are invisible in the track of average non- 
farm wage growth. 
Perhaps the supply shocks of the 1970s had so little apparent effect on the 
rate of growth of nominal wages because they were not fully accommodated, 
but were instead  accompanied by  serious recessions. Perhaps an alternative 
world in which the Federal Reserve sought to fully accommodate the increases 
in nominal spending and avoid a supply-shock recession entirely would have 
generated significant acceleration in wage increases. This seems likely: cer- 
tainly in the absence of  such supply shocks a recession  as deep as that of 
1974-75  could reasonably have been expected to cause a considerable slow- 
down in nominal wage growth. 
But the combination of supply-shock inflation and supply-shock recession, 
taken together, appears to have had little permanent impact on the nominal 
wage dynamics of the U.S. economy in either the mid- or the late 1970s. Be- 
fore the supply shocks hit, wage inflation was slowly trending upward. After 
the supply shocks had passed, price inflation quickly returned to levels consis- 
tent with wage and productivity growth, and wage inflation was slowly trend- 
ing upward. 
Thus it is hard to  sustain the argument that the root of the U.S. inflation 
problem in the 1970s was the interaction of  one-shot upward supply shocks 
with  a  backward-looking  wage-price  mechanism  that  incorporated  past 
changes in prices into future changes in wages. As Blinder (1982, 264) put it, 
attempts to diminish the size of the recession that followed such a shock would 
lead “inflation from the special factor [to] get built into the baseline. . . . This 
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stand why baseline inflation [rose from] . . . perhaps 1-2%  in the early 1960s 
. . .  to perhaps 4-5%  by the early 1970s and to perhaps 9-10%  by 1980.” 
The alternative narrative that I would prefer goes roughly as follows: the 
baseline inflation rate was some 5% per year in the early 1970s before there 
were any supply shocks; the baseline inflation rate was pushed up by perhaps 
2 percentage points as a result of the collapse in productivity growth; the base- 
line inflation rate appeared to be 8 or 9% per year by  1980. Supply shocks may 
well have tended to push baseline inflation up, but the supply-shock reces- 
sions-which  no  one  anticipated-put  approximately equal  and  opposite 
amounts of downward pressure on baseline inflation. 
There is, arithmetically,  little to be accounted for by the feedback of supply- 
shock-induced price increases onto the wage-setting process-unless  you hold 
a strong belief that nominal wage growth would have significantly decelerated 
in the 1970s in the absence of supply shocks. 
6.4.2  Linkage 
Were the supply shocks of the 1970s the result of bad luck or bad policy? 
One of the many  theories floating around the Nixon administration is that 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sought the tripling of world oil prices as a 
way of subsidizing the shah of Iran. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Kis- 
singer did not believe that the United States would ever project its own military 
power into regions like the Persian Gulf, yet also believed that the gulf area 
needed to be protected against Soviet or Soviet-client military threat. The pol- 
icy adopted was to arm  the shah: in Kissinger’s words, “we adopted a policy 
which provides, in effect, that we will accede to any of the Shah’s requests for 
arms purchases from us” (Isaacson 1992,503). But in order to buy U.S. weap- 
ons, the shah needed U.S. dollars. The tripling of world oil prices in late 1973 
provided the shah with ample U.S.  dollars; former Treasury Secretary William 
Simon believes that the linkage was not  accidental; Nixon’s  ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia claimed that Kissinger refused Saudi requests to pressure Iran 
not to push for major price increases at 1973 OPEC meetings. 
The judgment of Kissinger biographer Walter Isaacson ( 1992)-a  judgment 
that it is easy to share after working for the government, or for any large organi- 
zation-is  that conspiracy assumes more rationality and foresight than a gov- 
ernment pos~esses.~ 
6.5  Toward Volcker’s Disinflation 
6.5.1  Humphrey-Hawkins 
The recession of  1974-75  made it politically dangerous to be an advocate 
of restrictive monetary policy to reduce inflation. Near the trough of the reces- 
9. Nevertheless the Nixon administration showed little interest in making a rollback of the 1973 
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sion, Hubert Humphrey and Augustus Hawkins sought to require that the gov- 
ernment reduce unemployment to 3% within four years after passage, that it 
offer employment to all who wished at the same “prevailing wage” that Davis- 
Bacon  mandated  be  paid  on government  construction  projects,  and  (in  its 
House version) that individuals have the right to sue in federal court for their 
Humphrey-Hawkins jobs if the federal government had not provided them. 
In early 1976, the National Journal assessed the Humphrey-Hawkins bill’s 
chances of passage as quite good-though  principally as veto bait to create an 
issue for Democrats to campaign against Gerald Ford, rather than as a desir- 
able policy. 
Arthur  Burns tried  to  avoid  getting  sucked  into  this  lose-lose  situation: 
“Humphrey-Hawkins  . . . continues the old game of  setting a target for the 
unemployment rate. You  set one figure. I set another figure. If  your figure is 
low, you  are a friend of  mankind;  if  mine  is high,  I  am a servant  of Wall 
Street. . . . I  think  that  is  not  a  profitable  game”  (Wells  1994,  199). And 
Humphrey-Hawkins eventually did generate significant opposition from within 
the Democratic coalition. Labor would not support the bill unless Humphrey- 
Hawkins jobs paid the prevailing wage (fearing the consequences for union- 
ized public employment if the “prevailing wage” clause was dropped); legisla- 
tors who feared criticism from economists’ judgment that Humphrey-Hawkins 
was likely to be inflationary would not support the bill unless the “prevailing 
wage” clause was removed (see Weir 1992). 
The bill that finally passed and was signed in  1977 set a target of reducing 
unemployment to 4% by 1983, elevated price stability to a goal equal in impor- 
tance to full employment, set a goal of zero inflation by  1988, called for the 
reduction  of  federal  spending  to the  lowest  level  consistent  with  national 
needs, and required the Federal Reserve chairman to testify twice a year. It did 
nothing at all-save  commit the Federal Reserve chairman to a twice-a-year 
round of congressional testimony. 
6.5.2  Jimmy Carter 
Nevertheless,  the  existence  of  Humphrey-Hawkins,  and  the  consequent 
commitment  of first the Carter administration and then Carter’s selection as 
Arthur Burns’s successor, G. William Miller, to returning the economy to full 
employment had unpleasant consequences. To  a small degree it was a matter 
of bad luck: senior Carter economic officials have talked of the year “when our 
forecasts of real GNP growth were dead on-only  the productivity slowdown 
meant that the end-of-year unemployment rate was a full percentage point be- 
low where we had forecast.” To a larger degree it was the result of the lack of 
interest and focus in the Carter White House on inflation, in spite of efforts by 
sought to use the shah’s fear of the Soviet Union and dependence on American military advisers 
for training as levers for a rollback on the price of oil, Kissinger proved “reluctant to use leverage 
and linkage-nsually  the paired arrows of his diplomatic quiver-to  put pressure on the shah” 
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economists like Charles Schultze to warn that inflation was likely to suddenly 
become a severe surprise problem in  1979 and  1980-unless  a strategy for 
dealing with it was evolved earlier. 
Inflation did become a severe surprise political problem in 1979, generating 
the only episode in history in which a CEA chairman (Charles Schultze) and 
a treasury secretary (Michael Blumenthal) waged a campaign of leak and innu- 
endo to try to get the Federal Reserve chairman (G. William Miller) to tighten 
monetary policy (Kettl 1986). Almost invariably the pressure from the White 
House to the Federal Reserve is exerted in the opposite direction. 
Few if any people are willing to say a good word about G. William Miller’s 
tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve. He lasted sixteen months, and then 
replaced Michael Blumenthal as secretary of the treasury. Stuart Eizenstat- 
President Carter’s assistant for domestic policy-always  claimed that Miller’s 
departure from the Federal Reserve was an accident. 
The President “accepts” the resignation of [Treasury Secretary] Blumenthal. 
Blumenthal is known as a voice against inflation, and this adds to the confu- 
sion. So we were without a Treasury Secretary. So the President makes calls. 
Reg Jones of  General Electric, Irv Shapiro of  Du Pont, David Rockefeller 
of Chase Manhattan-all  are asked and turn it down. This becomes a grave 
situation. The idea surfaces-I’m  not sure where-that  Bill Miller take the 
job. Bill takes it. That then creates a hole at the Fed. and that makes the 
financial markets even more nervous. (Grieder 1987,20-21) 
Could the Volcker disinflation have  been undertaken earlier? Had Gerald 
Ford won  reelection in  1976 and reappointed Arthur Bums, would we now 
speak of the Bums disinflation? Or would the same political pressure that had 
driven Nixon into wage and price controls have driven a second Ford adminis- 
tration into overestimation of the available room for economic expansion? Her- 
bert Stein (1984, 215), at least, is skeptical: “We do not know whether a Ford 
administration . . . kept in office . . . would have  persisted” in a course that 
would have kept inflation declining, “but we  do know that the basis for the 
persistence of  such a course had not been laid.” And he attributes the failures 
of  the Carter administration and the Carter-era Federal Reserve at inflation 
control “not . . . chiefly a reflection of  the personalities involved . . . [but] a 
response to the prevailing attitude in the country about the goals of monetary 
policy.” In Stein’s opinion, the Federal Reserve did not as of the mid-1970s 
have a mandate to do whatever turned out to be necessary to curb inflation. 
G. William Miller’s successor as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board was 
Paul Volcker. 
6.6  Conclusion 
6.6.1  The Truest Cause 
If  the particular chain of events that caused the inflation of  the 1970s had 
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the most important factor was not the particular misstep of policy but the back- 
ground situation that made it highly probable that sooner or later a misstep 
would generate an inflation like that  of  the  1970s. Perfect  macroeconomic 
management-successful  walking of  the fine line between too-low employ- 
ment and accelerating inflation-in  the 1960s would not have eliminated the 
burst of  inflation seen in the 1970s. The burst would have come differently, 
probably later. Perhaps it would have been larger, perhaps it would have been 
smaller. 
But sooner or later politicians  and economists working in a  1960s-style 
Keynesian framework would have tried to squeeze a little too much production 
and employment out of the economy, wound up with the average annual rate 
of nominal wage growth ratcheted upward from 3-6%  or more per year, and 
faced the same dilemmas and painful choices faced at the start of the 1970s. 
Thus the “truest cause” was not President Johnson’s reluctance to raise taxes 
to offset the costs of the Vietnam War, but a situation in which attempting to 
drive unemployment down to and keep it at 3% was regarded as a “nonperfec- 
tionist goal” by economists and politicians alike. Indeed, given the limited in- 
fluence of economists over economic policy, it was probably sufficient for the 
inflation of  the 1970s that politicians remembered the Great Depression, and 
took the reduction of unemployment to its minimum as a major goal of eco- 
nomic policy. 
6.6.2  Could the 1970s Inflation Have Been Curbed Earlier? 
There were no technical factors that would have prevented an earlier, rapid 
curb of the inflation of the 1970s. But there were political factors that would 
have prevented a quick reversal of the runup in core inflation that occurred in 
the late 1960s. At the start of the 1970s, the Federal Reserve lacked a mandate 
to fight inflation by inducing a significant recession. No one then had a man- 
date to fight inflation by allowing the unemployment rate to rise. Indeed, there 
was close to a mandate to do the reverse-to  throw overboard any institutional 
arrangements, like the Bretton Woods international monetary system, as soon 
as they showed any sign of requiring that internal economic management be 
subordinated to external balance. 
This lack of a mandate showed itself in many places, in many aspects. In 
the absence of such a mandate, the Federal Reserve’s “independence” not just 
from the executive branch, but from the rest of  the government in total, was 
purely theoretical. It is difficult to imagine any chairman of the Board of Gov- 
ernors pursuing anti-inflation policy to the limits necessary to achieve signifi- 
cant containment, and thus risking the survival of the institution, in the circum- 
stances of the early 1970s. 
A mandate to fight inflation by inducing a significant recession was probably 
not in place by  the end of  1976. The original drafts of Humphrey-Hawkins 
contained language that “if the President determines that the [Federal Reserve] 
Board’s policies are inconsistent with  . . . this Act, the President shall make 
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A mandate was barely in place by the end of  1978, when we saw-and  this 
is perhaps the only time we will ever see it-a  CEA chair and a secretary of 
the treasury wage a bureaucratic war-by-leak in an attempt to induce the Fed- 
eral Reserve to tighten monetary policy. 
A mandate to fight inflation by inducing a significant recession was in place 
by  1979, as a result of a combination of perceptions and fears about the cost 
of inflation, worry about what the “transformation of every business venture 
into a speculation on monetary policy” was doing to the underlying prosperity 
of the American economy, and fear that the structure of expectations was about 
to become unanchored and that permanent double-digit inflation was about to 
become a possibility. 
But the process by which the Federal Reserve obtained its information man- 
date to fight inflation by inducing significant recession was slow and informal. 
Part of its terms of existence require that it never be made explicit. It is difficult 
to imagine its coming into being-and  thus the Federal Reserve’s “indepen- 
dence” being transformed from a quirk of bureaucratic organization into a real 
and powerful feature of America’s political  economy-without  some lesson 
like that taught by the history of the 1970s. 
Today many observers would say that the costs of the Volcker disinflation of 
the early  1980s were  certainly  worth paying,  comparing  the U.S. economy 
today with relatively stable prices and relatively moderate unemployment with 
what they estimate to have been the likely consequence of business as usual: 
inflation slowly creeping upward from near 10 toward 20% per year over the 
198Os, and higher unemployment as well as inflation deranged the functioning 
of  the price mechanism. In the United States today, inflation is low, and the 
reduction of inflation to low single-digit levels has been accomplished without 
the seemingly permanent transformation of “cyclical” into “structural” unem- 
ployment seen in so many countries of Europe. 
Nevertheless, other observers believe that there ought to have been a better 
way: perhaps inflation could have been brought under control more cheaply 
by a successful incomes policy made up of a government-business-labor com- 
pact to restrain nominal wage growth (which certainly would have been in the 
AFL-CIO’s interest, as it is harder to think of anything worse for that organiza- 
tion’s long-term strength than the 1980s as they actually happened).  Perhaps 
inflation  could have been brought  under control more cheaply by  a Federal 
Reserve that did a better job of  communicating  its expectations and targets; 
but note that the dispute over whether “gradualism” (in the sense of the British 
Tory Party’s medium-term financial strategy; see Taylor 1980, 1992) or “cold- 
turkey” (see Sargent 1982) was the most cost-effective way of reducing infla- 
tion has not been resolved; it is hard to fault those who made economic policy 
decisions when even those economists with ample hindsight do not speak with 
one voice. 275  America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s 
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Comment  John B. Taylor 
Bradford De Long’s paper is a wonderful read. It starts with a convincing dem- 
onstration of the historical significance of the 1970s inflation (the great infla- 
tion), documenting its long duration, its multinational dimension, and its prob- 
able lasting effect on the future course of  economic policy  and history. As 
the 1970s fade into the past-already  today’s college freshmen have no direct 
memory of this period-it  is valuable merely to record these events and the 
lessons to be drawn from them. Monetary theory-more  so than any other 
branch of  economics-needs  this type of history to supplement our under- 
standing of how policy affects the economy. The paper brings this history alive 
with juicy quotes from both the economists and the politicians who made eco- 
nomic policy during this period. 
De Long not only documents the history of the great inflation, he examines 
its causes. He concludes, and I agree, that the “price shocks” of the 1970s were 
not the cause of the inflation; in fact, the inflation was already under way before 
1972 when the oil price shocks began. To this I would add that the oil price 
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shocks of the late 1970s had very small inflationary effects in Japan after a 
much less accommodative monetary policy was put in place. 
De Long also apparently rejects modern time-inconsistency  arguments as 
an explanation of the great inflation. The rejection is implicit because he com- 
pletely omits any discussion of the subject. Surprisingly, he does not even men- 
tion the well-known time-inconsistency work of Barro and Gordon (1983) or 
Kydland and Prescott (1  977), which may be the most frequently cited reason 
why monetary policy led to excessively high inflation. Is De Long correct in 
dismissing this argument out of hand? 
In fact, the time-inconsistency model does have the potential to explain the 
great  inflation,  as  argued by  Parkin  (1993).  In  the  basic  Kydland-Prescott 
model of  the inflatiodunemployment  trade-off, the “suboptimal”  consistent 
policy (or what Barro and Gordon call the discretion policy) is assumed to be 
the long-run equilibrium inflation rate and unemployment rate. There is an 
important theorem about this suboptimal equilibrium: the higher the natural 
rate of unemployment is, the higher the equilibrium inflation rate is. 
Parkin uses this theorem to explain the 1970s inflation in the United States 
by noting that the natural rate of unemployment rose in the 1970s, as the young 
postwar  baby-boom  generation  entered  the  workforce,  and declined in the 
1980s  as  the  baby-boom  generation  aged.  Hence,  the  time-inconsistency 
model implies that the equilibrium inflation rate should have risen in the 1970s 
and fallen in the  1980s, just as the actual inflation rate rose and fell. I have 
questioned the Parkin explanation (Taylor 1993b) on the grounds that the time- 
inconsistency  model is not persuasive  as a positive economic theory in the 
case of  the inflation-unemployment trade-off, because people would see the 
suboptimality of the equilibrium and attempt to fix it with laws or other social 
arrangements. But even if one finds the time-inconsistency  model persuasive 
in this case, the Parkin explanation fails another important test; in particular, it 
does not explain why inflation also rose and then fell in  Europe where the 
natural rate of unemployment kept rising throughout the 1980s. Hence, as my 
brief summary indicates, De Long is probably right to reject time inconsis- 
tency as an explanation of  the great inflation. 
De Long argues that the main reason for the great inflation-the  “truest” 
cause-was  the  memory  of  the  Great  Depression  itself  and  the  deep fear 
people had of  a return to high unemployment. In other words, he argues, poli- 
cymakers and the public were willing to let inflation rise because, having re- 
cently experienced the high unemployment  of  the  1930s, they worried that 
maintaining price stability would lead to greater unemployment. 
I have doubts about De Long’s explanation. If  the experience of the Great 
Depression caused Americans and their political leaders to sacrifice the goal 
of price stability in the late 1960s and 1970s, then why did monetary policy 
leave the price level so nearly  stable during the  1950s and early  1960s-a 
period much closer to the Great Depression  and nearly as long? We  should 
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story. True, as De Long argues, the great inflation may just have been an acci- 
dent waiting to happen, but I think there are more explicit factors that must 
have played a role. 
In my view the development by economists and the adoption by policymak- 
ers of new macroeconomic ideas in the  1960s (the New Economics) deserves 
much of the credit, or blame, for the great inflation. The ideas were intellectu- 
ally exciting, carefully explained, and widely disseminated; and the timing was 
just about perfect to explain the events. 
First was the idea that there was a long-run Phillips curve, which appeared 
in the Economic Report of  the President (for example,  1969, 95) and many 
textbooks, and which was widely discussed by the media. This idea indicated 
that the cost of an overheated economy would simply be higher inflation, rather 
than accelerating inflation. 
Second was the view that the “full-employment unemployment rate” (what 
we would now call the natural rate) was 4%, and perhaps even lower. Although 
there was little evidence for this low figure at the time, it was put forth by 
many economists, including the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and it 
became widely accepted and difficult to change. As late as 1976 when a differ- 
ent CEA revised the estimate to 4.9%, they were widely criticized by politi- 
cians and the public for doing so (Economic Report of  the President  1977). I 
recall that when Alan Greenspan  and Burt Malkiel testified  before the Joint 
Economic Committee about their CEA’s upward revision, they were lambasted 
by Senator Hubert Humphrey. That their estimate did not quite hit 5% may be 
indicative  of  their concern about confronting too directly the persistent and 
strongly held views about the 4% estimate held outside of economists’ circles. 
This low estimate of the natural rate and the notion of a long-run Phillips 
curve trade-off led politicians to a certain fearlessness about using monetary 
policy  to  overstimulate  the  economy.  For example,  President Johnson  was 
driven by his desire to put “easy money” people on the Federal Reserve Board. 
According to Joseph Califano in the “Guns and Butter” chapter of his Triumph 
and Tragedy of  Lyndon Johnson (1991, 109), Federal Reserve Board chairman 
Martin “was threatening to resign if Johnson put another liberal on the Board.” 
Califano then goes on to explain how, nevertheless, Johnson managed to find 
yet another Federal Reserve Board candidate, who the president was convinced 
had good “easy money” credentials, and then  make this appointment to the 
board despite Martin’s strong misgivings. 
A counter to this argument about the influence of the long-run Phillips curve 
is that as early as 1968 Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps were explaining 
that there was no such thing as a Phillips curve; excessive monetary expansion 
which temporarily brought unemployment below the natural rate would lead 
to ucceleruting  inflation. However, at least in its early years, the Friedman- 
Phelps  accelerationist  model  appears  to have  had  little  practical  influence 
in leading to greater price stability. What the accelerationist model did, in my 
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which had already led to higher inflation, into an analysis showing that the 
costs of disinflation were so great that we should either not reduce inflation or 
we should do so incredibly gradually. For example, as late as 1978, in a Brook- 
ings Papers on Economic Activity issue entitled “Innovative Policies to Slow 
Inflation,” George Perry (1978) showed that it would require 10% of GDP to 
reduce inflation by  1%. Pessimistic estimates such as these undoubtedly af- 
fected policymakers’ thinking. 
In the 1974  White House Economists Conference on Injution with President 
Ford, virtually all the distinguished economists bemoaned the extraordinarily 
high costs of inflation reduction. Because of these costs Paul Samuelson and 
Walter Heller emphasized that perhaps inflation was not much of  a problem. 
As Walter Heller stated at the conference, “in bringing inflation to its knees, 
we will put the economy flat on its back” (128). And Samuelson argued elo- 
quently that we do not need a Winston Churchill-like “blood, sweat, and tears” 
program to reduce inflation (71).  Among the economists at the conference only 
Milton Friedman argued unequivocally for inflation reduction: the “strength 
[of the US.  economy] is currently being eroded by the disease of inflation. If 
that disease is not checked it will take a heavy toll including, in my opinion, the 
very likely destruction of our personal, political and economic freedoms. . . .  I 
heartily applaud, also, the expressed determination of the Federal Reserve to 
slow monetary growth . . . despite the cries of  anguish about this table and 
elsewhere about tight money, the slowing has so far lasted two or three months 
so we cannot yet be sure the Fed has really departed from the ever more infla- 
tionary path it has been following for the past decade” (122-23). 
But Milton Friedman was the exception. The more common view among 
economists throughout the 1970s was that it was hardly worth the high costs 
to reduce inflation, and this view was based on the expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve, not simply the original Phillips curve. 
In my view, the introduction of rational expectations as a model of  the ex- 
pectations term in the Phillips curve was  ultimately influential in changing 
views both about the costs of reducing inflation and the costs of inflation itself. 
Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace’s striking estimate (1975) that the costs of 
disinflation were essentially zero for a credible policy certainly got people to 
think about alternative views. My own estimate made in the late 1970s (which 
incorporated both sticky prices and rational expectations) found that the disin- 
flation costs were 60%  smaller than George Perry had reported (see Taylor 
1993a). 
But whatever its source, the realization that the costs of disinflation might 
be smaller than the most dire warnings coupled with the clear dislike by  the 
general public of  inflation ultimately led to the end of the great inflation or- 
chestrated by Paul Volcker at the Fed. Jimmy Carter and his advisers get credit 
for appointing Volcker to the Fed, and Ronald Reagan and his advisers get 
credit for helping to maintain the Fed’s disinflation resolve through the early 
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Ronald Reagan’s explicit support for the Fed’s price-stability goals in 1982 
even when unemployment was high and the midterm elections approached (see 
Martin Feldstein’s retrospective [  1994]), contrasts sharply with Lyndon John- 
son’s attitude toward inflation in the late 1960s as reported by Joseph Califano. 
Hence, the fifteen-year cycle of  macroeconomic opinion corresponds closely 
with changes of opinion of the top national economic policymakers as well as 
with the timing of  the rise and fall of the inflation rate, that is, with both the 
great inflation and the great disinflation. 
In my view, these changing economic theories and opinions about inflation 
are the ultimate cause of the changes in actual inflation. At the least this view 
provides a more complete explanation of the timing of the event than the “acci- 
dent waiting to happen” view put forth in De Long’s excellent history of the 
times. 
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